Commercial Law and the Public Interest by Westbrook, Jay Lawrence
Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 
Volume 4 
Issue 1 Seventeenth Biennial Meeting of the 
International Academy of Commercial and 
Consumer Law 
December 2015 
Commercial Law and the Public Interest 
Jay Lawrence Westbrook 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/jlia 
 Part of the Diplomatic History Commons, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine Commons, 
International and Area Studies Commons, International Law Commons, International Trade Law 
Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Political Science Commons, Public Affairs, Public Policy and 




Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Commercial Law and the Public Interest, 4 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT'L AFF. 445 
(2015). 
Available at: https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/jlia/vol4/iss1/19 
The Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs is a joint publication of Penn State’s School of Law and 
School of International Affairs. 
Penn State 
Journal of Law & International Affairs 
2015 VOLUME 4 NO. 1 
COMMERCIAL LAW AND THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST 
Jay Lawrence Westbrook* 
In commercial law policy debates in the United States, the 
consideration of public interests has been muted.  The success of 
“contractualist” ideas (along with “public choice” theory) has forced 
to the background notions of broader social interests and the 
significant secondary effects of commercial law rules, leaving the policy 
debates focused largely on competing claims of efficiency and injustice 
to the immediate parties to an activity or transaction.  In this essay, I 
want to explore this phenomenon in a preliminary way.  My long-term 
objective is to understand the reasons for this move away from 
considerations of public interests and perhaps to find a way to return 
those interests to their proper place. 
                                                 
* Benno Schmidt Chair of Business Law, The University of 
Texas School of Law.  I am grateful to Patrick Wolfgang, Texas ‘15, 
and William Langley and Kelsi Stayart, Texas ‘16, for their help in 
research for my public-interest project, starting with this article.  This 
paper was delivered in the summer of 2014.  While its principal 
points continue to reflect my views and the nature of my current 
academic project, those views and the world have moved on in some 
respects.  In particular, I have become more careful to say “public 
interests” (plural).  I also note that the American Bankruptcy Institute 
Commission has now delivered recommendations about bankruptcy 
reform that provide a rich medium for critiques based on public 
interests.  See AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE 
COMMISSION TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11 
(2014). 
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How did the notion of a public interest in commercial law 
questions get elbowed aside when it had long been a staple of 
American academic and political discourse?  The primary reason has 
been the rise of “public choice” theories1 and “contractualism.”2  This 
essay focuses on the contractualists as its primary example. For the 
most part, the contractualists are content to identify one public 
interest—freedom of contract in a free market—as the singular public 
interest to be served in commercial law, primarily on the basis of 
efficiency. 
One of the reasons that other public interest considerations 
have been elbowed aside is that those who are concerned with public 
interest factors do not have a church as do the public choice and 
contractualist scholars. That is, these scholars have a set of 
institutions—conferences, centers, and the like—and a common set of 
intellectual “moves” and terminology combined with a deep sense that 
their approach is almost always the best approach to any legal policy 
question. 
In my field of insolvency, Professor Douglas Baird has 
attempted a distinction between “proceduralists” and “traditionalists” 
to mark these scholars from the rest,3 but the labels are not very helpful 
and the foundation for them is weak.  I think it is more useful to focus 
on the contractualists versus the “regulators” (both of which are 
defined below). 
I try in this essay to explain how and why public interests have 
been ignored. The essay form permits suggestion and speculation to 
substitute for precision and detailed references in these early stages of 
my developing project.  Many points are uncertain at this stage.  I am 
unclear, for example, whether the relative decline of arguments about 
                                                 
  
1   See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN, PUBLIC CHOICE: THE ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF A RESEARCH PROGRAM (2003). 
2  See, e.g., ELIZABETH WARREN, JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, 
KATHERINE PORTER & JOHN POTTOW, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 
(7th ed. 2014) [hereinafter DEBTORS AND CREDITORS].  
3   See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 
576-77 (1998). For a critique of his position, see Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Empirical 
Research in Consumer Bankruptcy, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2123 (2002).   
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the public interest is primarily an American phenomenon or one found 
in many parts of the academic world. 
The most challenging element in the analysis is the definition 
of the public interest as distinct from an individual or aggregate 
interest.  An example may help at the start.  In debates about the 
enforcement of form (boilerplate) contracts against consumers, those 
favoring enforcement generally speak of freedom of contract in a 
market society and rely on the consumer’s consent as the central reason 
for enforcement.  Those who would limit enforcement generally argue 
(a) that the consumer does not really consent in a meaningful sense; 
and (b) that, even with consent, enforcement of some or all of the form 
provisions would be unjust or unfair to the consumer party. 
The arguments on each side have considerable power, but my 
point here is that each argument is rights-based—that is, limited to the 
rights of one of the parties to the contract. The arguments may apply 
to many sellers that issue form contracts and to millions of consumers 
against whom they might be enforced, but this aggregation of instances 
does not amount to an argument about the public interest.  No doubt 
the sellers’ advocates would claim that society generally is benefitted 
by enforcement, and the consumers’ champions would make the same 
claim about nonenforcement, but each would be speaking of the 
aggregation of individual results, not a distinct collective interest that 
should be included in determining an appropriate legal policy. 
By contrast, other sorts of arguments—whether good or bad 
on the merits—would be based on a notion of the public interest.  As 
a first approximation, a public interest may be defined as a concern 
about the positive and negative effects of a policy on most of the 
people in society, including those whose individual interests are not 
directly implicated by a given transaction or activity.  In our pending 
example, the public interest in boilerplate might include factors 
different from freedom of contract or an unjust result for the 
consumer party. 
There are a number of public interest concerns in the context 
of form contracts.  One category might be called “secondary effects.” 
Consider the consumer advocate’s argument that courts or regulators 
should be more ready than they have been to strike down unreasonable 
and oppressive contract terms.  One aspect of that claim would be the 
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benefit to the consumers thus spared from enforcement of those 
terms.  But another would be the assertion that judicial activism would 
serve the public interest by arming the sellers’ lawyers with tools to 
convince their clients to draft form contracts with a more even hand.  
That result might benefit society generally by giving everyone more 
confidence in entering into form contracts and creating a pervasive 
sense of fairness in the market place.  This sort of argument differs 
from the individual rights argument because it rests upon costs and 
benefits to society generally rather than arguments about “true” 
consent or normative beliefs about fairness.  This sort of argument is 
also less subject to claims of individual consent or waiver.  My sense is 
that this sort of shift in the focus of the argument would be important, 
albeit sometimes subtle in the abstract.4 
For the purposes of this paper, I have no interest in how these 
arguments come out or in the numerous counter and counter-counter 
arguments that would arise.  The necessary point is that there may be 
a public interest to be identified and that interest may have a significant 
influence on the nature and direction of the debate.  It can have that 
effect even though it must be conceded that the importance of the 
distinction is sometimes masked by the difficulty in making it.  It must 
also be conceded that aggregate and public interest benefits/harms 
may overlap considerably, but that ambiguity does not necessarily 
make the public interest less salient. 
I. THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
In recent years, discourse in many legal fields has been 
“privatized” by the assumption that the stakes—the benefits and 
costs—at play in a given activity are limited to the private parties who 
are individually interested in possible outcomes.  Commercial scholars 
are prominent among those committed to this view.  Such scholars are 
                                                 
4   These sorts of arguments are often about “externalities,” positive or 
negative, that are recognized in principal in contractualist presentations, but are often 
omitted or subordinated.  Externalities sometimes effect only a certain group of 
people and therefore are not public interest questions in the sense that I am using 
the phrase.  But a fair number of public interest arguments are about ignored 
externalities. 
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generally found among those who embrace “public choice” theory and 
among those whom I have characterized as “contractualists.”5 
Loosely speaking, scholars who embrace the “public choice” 
theory might claim that there is rarely such a thing as a public interest 
that is relevant to a legal issue, only an aggregation of private ones that 
become expressed in law largely as a matter of interest group wins, 
losses, or compromises. 
Next door live the contractualists, who believe that commercial 
policies are best understood as a series of contracts, rather than 
sovereign commands.  For them, the ideal society consists of a web of 
contracts freely adopted by each person.  (Locke meets the Uniform 
Commercial Code.) Because public law is sometimes a practical 
necessity, that law should be defined by the results that private 
contracts would produce if they were feasible.  The contractualists are 
in turn divided between those who view the contractual approach as a 
useful metaphor for determining the correct legal result and others 
who argue for commercial laws that facilitate actual bargains that 
would replace substantive legislative rules to the maximum extent, 
often by enabling the legal contortions necessary to attempt to avoid 
the problem of third-party effects.  Each of these views privatizes legal 
thought by banishing traditional notions of a societal or collective 
interest. Their opponents I will call the “regulators”: scholars who are 
more sympathetic to mandatory legal rules and government regulation 
in the public interest. 
Both public choice and contractualism are closely related to 
neoclassical economic theory and to the Law and Economics 
“movement” in the U.S. and elsewhere, with its emphasis on increasing 
efficiency in the generation of wealth and its disinterest in questions of 
wealth distribution.  They also parallel a reductionism in political 
science, where the literature has been dominated by interest group 
influence and legislator self-interest, rather than the actors’ beliefs and 
perceptions about the public interest.  In recent years, this approach 
has been extended to scholarship about judges, seeking patterns of 
decision-making related to political affiliations and personal 
                                                 
5   See Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting Out of 
Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1199 (2005); DEBTORS 
AND CREDITORS, supra note 2.   
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backgrounds.  Much of this scholarship is useful, but like the 
rhododendron it has too often exterminated valuable competitors. 
These and other factors have contributed to a focus on 
individual rights and obligations and thus on individual benefits and 
harms.  This focus has had a major impact on policy debates.  
American examples of affected policy issues include the existence vel 
non of private rights of action based on statutory provisions that do not 
explicitly grant such rights; the nature of fiduciary and other 
management duties owed to investors and creditors in corporate law; 
the proper scope of arbitration clauses in both consumer and 
international commercial arbitration; and the emergence of secured 
creditor domination of the reorganization of distressed businesses.  In 
this essay, I want to address just the last one as an illustration. 
II. AN EXAMPLE: THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN 
REORGANIZATION CASES 
Chapter 11 reorganization lies at the heart of United States 
insolvency law, and it is the primary feature of our law that has 
influenced legal reformers all over the world.  Yet it seems to me that 
some of the central policies that drove its adoption in the United States 
and its influence elsewhere in the world have become obscured in 
modern scholarship.  Obviously, the achievement of a law’s goal 
should be the touchstone for every aspect of its implementation, yet 
often in the United States goals are merely assumed and these 
assumptions often change sub silencio.  For example, there is 
considerable discussion currently about the control of Chapter 11 
proceedings by secured creditors, but relatively little attention to the 
goals of Chapter 11 in relation to control rights.  Because secured 
creditor control effectively converts Chapter 11 to a vehicle for a 
version of contractualism, it is congenial to that school but unattractive 
to those who see a larger role for protective rules in the Bankruptcy 
Code.  The correct result of the contention between them ultimately 
turns on convictions about the proper goals for reorganization law. 
I do not attempt here to make the case for or against creditor 
control or to answer the larger predicate question, which is the purpose 
of reorganization procedures.  Instead I want to put on the table some 
of the public interest issues that should be part of those discussions. 
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It is striking that the debate has become almost entirely rights 
based, ignoring any suggestion of public interests in the outcome, just 
as with the form consumer contract example discussed earlier.  The 
debate has been conducted by scholars committed to a private-sector, 
free-market view versus those more concerned with normative values 
like protecting weak parties and nonparticipating parties.  As with form 
contracts, the lack of apparent concern with a public interest is often 
found on both sides.6 
Most of the scholars who favor secured creditor control are 
contractualists or quasi-contractualists.  Dean Robert Rasmussen is a 
pure contractualist who would use a company’s articles of 
incorporation as a standard contract with creditors: 
When a firm is formed, it would be required to select 
what courses of action it wishes to have available if it 
runs into financial difficulties down the road. . . . By 
offering a discrete set of choices, the menu would 
enable banks and other creditors to anticipate the 
interest-rate adjustments that would be made for each 
option. They could then communicate to those 
establishing the firm the true cost of selecting one 
bankruptcy provision over another.7 
His fellow contractualists propose various other techniques for 
producing contractual agreement, but all support their position with 
arguments that rest on benefits to the individual firms as debtors or 
creditors and consider any possible harms in the same way.  Underlying 
their approach is only one contention that could be read as invoking 
the public interest.  Professor Lynn LoPucki, a frequent opponent of 
the contractualists, summarizes that argument as follows: 
                                                 
6   A nice example of the absence of the public interest argument is found 
in the Detroit bankruptcy where little of the legal debate seems to have addressed 
the public interest benefits arising from the availability to the public of a remarkable 
collection of art at very low cost.  Yet that interest had a major impact on the results 
of the case.  See Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form and Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy, 
33 YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming 2016) (importance to the public of preservation 
of art museum). 
7   Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate 
Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 66-67 (1992). 
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The case for freedom of contract rests squarely on the 
assumption that each party chooses the contract 
because the contract makes that party better off. 
Because each party is better off, all parties are better 
off in the aggregate. That aggregate then becomes a 
proxy for “social welfare.” In the bankruptcy context, 
this theory holds that thousands of correct decisions 
by a debtor and each of its creditors and shareholders 
will generate one correct decision—the bankruptcy 
contract—in the aggregate. That decision will 
maximize social welfare.8 
Other contractualists hedge their commitment to contract a bit 
more than Dean Rasmussen, but their caveats serve to emphasize their 
concern with individual rights and obligations.  Thus Professor Steven 
Schwarcz limits enforceability of contract deviations from the 
“default” rules of the Bankruptcy Code to those that do not offend the 
principle of equality of distribution nor create an externality that would 
be unenforceable as a matter of contract law.9  The former limit is 
protective of the rights of claimants in a specific case, while the latter 
amounts to a public policy exception, something rarely found in 
American contract law and quite different from the broader and much 
more common instance of a relevant public interest. 
Only one contractualist article has seemed to me to rely 
importantly on a public interest other than the general ground of 
freedom of contract.  It was written by Professor Alan Schwartz who 
supported a contractualist approach with the claim that it would 
further the only legitimate goal of reorganization, which for him is 
generation of the lowest possible interest rate on debt capital.10  
Whatever the merits of that interesting assertion, it does make a claim 
about a public interest. It is probably significant that no other 
contractualist scholar has taken up that argument. 
                                                 
8   Lynn LoPucki, Contract Bankruptcy: A Reply to Alan Schwartz, 109 YALE 
L.J. 317, 341 (1999). 
9   Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, 
77 TEX. L. REV 515, 542-44 (1999). 
10   Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Contracting Reviewed, 109 YALE L.J. 343, 343 
(1999). 
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What is more surprising is that fairly often scholars who are 
regulators also focus on private concerns rather than public ones.  For 
example, I wrote an article directly attacking the contractualist position 
on secured creditor control of reorganization, but devoted it almost 
entirely to the negative effects of that approach on the maximization 
of value and fair distribution to the claimants rather than any 
considerations beyond those immediate parties.11  Elizabeth Warren 
and I launched a direct attack on the contractualists based on empirical 
data, but the entire thrust of the article was that a contractualist 
approach would result in disadvantage to various parties to a 
reorganization proceeding.12 The principal exception was a small 
section dealing with transaction costs, and even that had a focus on the 
contracting parties rather than society in general. 
Only two major articles on the rule maker side in the debates 
about bankruptcy seem to have squarely addressed an alleged public 
interest.  Professor Susan Block-Lieb pointed to the adoption of 
various statutes regarding pensions and retiree benefits as establishing 
a public interest that should have weight in making bankruptcy policy.13  
She insisted that Congressional action to support pension benefits 
represented a Congressional determination that pension protection 
was a general interest of our society and therefore required the 
consideration of that public interest in forming bankruptcy policy. 
Her discussion illustrated an important aspect of the conflict 
between party-oriented arguments and public interest arguments.  She 
explicitly rejected the standard contractualist argument that substantive 
public policy should have no place in bankruptcy, viz any concerns 
about pensions must be cabined in pension law discussions, concerns 
about financial speculation must be resolved in legislation directed at 
financial speculation, and so on.  The effect is to prevent many public 
interest factors from being given weight in making bankruptcy law. 
The compartmentalization of legal policy contributes substantially to a 
focus on the interests of the immediate parties to a particular economic 
relationship and away from a more general social or economic 
                                                 
11   See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. 
L. REV. 795, 837-52 (2004). 
12   See Warren & Westbrook, supra note 5. 
13   See Susan Block-Lieb, The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy, 2001 
U. ILL. L. REV. 503 (2001). 
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perspective. By taking on the argument against policy balkanization, 
Professor Block-Lieb staked out a position for substantive public 
interests in bankruptcy policy. 
The second major article pointing out public interest 
considerations in reorganization policy was written by Professor (now 
Senator) Elizabeth Warren.  In an article responding to the 
contractualist approach, Professor Warren listed the goals of 
bankruptcy as follows: 
Enhance Value. By creating specialized collection rules to 
govern in the case of multiple default and by requiring collective rather 
than individual action, the value to be gleaned from the failing business 
can be increased while the expenses of collecting that value are 
decreased. Bankruptcy rules can also preserve going concern value 
while they can cabin many forms of strategic behavior that would 
otherwise waste collective resources. 
Establish an Orderly Distribution Scheme. By moving away from 
the race of the diligent at state law, there can be a considered judgment 
of who should receive preferences in the event that not all parties’ 
expectations can be met. Distributions to parties with different legal 
rights can be settled in a legislative arena. Parties with no formal rights 
to the assets of the business, such as employees who will lose jobs and 
taxing authorities that will lose ratable property, may profit from a 
second chance at restructuring debt and giving the business a chance 
to survive in situ. 
Internalize the Costs of Default. A viable Chapter 11 system 
reduces the pressure on the government to bail out failing companies, 
thus forcing creditors to make market-based lending decisions and to 
monitor their debtors more closely. 
Establish a Privately Monitored System. The initiation decision in 
bankruptcy is one of the hardest. A system that provides sufficient 
incentives for debtors to choose bankruptcy voluntarily or for 
creditors to force their debtors into it avoids the high costs that come 
with a publicly monitored system, both in terms of the costs of errors 
(decisions to place a company in bankruptcy that come too quickly or 
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too slowly) and the costs of monitoring. Such a system also avoids the 
potential politicization of such decisions.14 
I have underlined portions of this list that reflect public interest 
factors.  It is important to note that Warren was not often able to cite 
specific provisions protecting such values.  Public interest factors are 
often hard to tie to particular legal rules.  In effect, legislators rely on 
the courts to have those factors in mind, along with the structure of a 
statutory system as a whole, when construing a rule. 
Generally, however, the debates about secured creditor control 
of reorganization and its relation to reorganization goals have settled 
into a rights argument with little attention to public interest factors. 
That is so despite the fact that the discussions surrounding the 
proposal and adoption of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 were filled with 
public interest factors supporting reorganization.  Jobs, community 
stability, and a second chance for company owners were high on the 
legislators’ lists of statutory goals. For example: 
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike 
a liquidation case, is to restructure a business’s 
financings so that it may continue to operate, provide 
its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce 
a return for its stockholders . . . It is more economically 
efficient to reorganize than to liquidate, because it 
preserves jobs and assets.15 
Taking the preservation of jobs as an example, there is 
evidence that public officials continue to be deeply concerned with the 
preservation of jobs, but jobs have virtually disappeared from the 
reorganization conversation in the United States. 
This point is illustrated when competing reorganization plans 
are presented to the courts.  Under some circumstances, the 
Bankruptcy Code permits more than one reorganization plan to be 
submitted to creditors.  If the necessary majorities vote in favor of both 
plans, which sometimes happens, the court must decide which plan to 
                                                 
14   See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 
MICH. L. REV. 336, 344-76 (1993) (emphasis added). 
15 H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977).
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adopt.  There is no statutory standard for making that choice, so the 
courts are free to consult such policy grounds as they think relevant.  
In the reported decisions on this point, there is little sign that the better 
preservation of jobs is a legitimate tie-breaker, despite the legislative 
history and despite the professed concerns of nearly all our political 
leaders.  The interests of communities are also ignored, despite 
widespread state-level legislation in the United States designed to 
protect communities against hostile takeovers. 
In addition to jobs and community stability, both mentioned 
by Warren, there was in 1978 an underlying theme of helping equity 
owners as well.  The new Chapter 11 arose from the old Chapter XI, 
which was designed to permit small business owners to keep their 
businesses alive through negotiating a payout plan with their creditors.  
Congress intended to extend this idea by permitting management of 
all businesses, large and small, to remain as the “Debtor in Possession.”  
Thus we have the view of Chapter 11 reflected in the United Kingdom 
terminology: “rescue” proceedings.16 That view of reorganization is 
reflected in the legislative history quoted above and continued to be a 
part of the culture and folklore of the new Chapter 11 well into its first 
decade. 
Given that history, it is far from evident that only bondholders 
and other creditors are entitled to consideration while shareholders are 
not. Yet at some point the focus of scholarship and practice narrowed 
to the interests of the immediate parties and their statutory 
entitlements. Although the abolition in 1978 of the “absolute priority” 
rule (which puts shareholders at the bottom of the priority waterfall) 
in its strictest form17 was intended to permit more flexibility in 
protecting the interests of shareholders, a number of articles continued 
to call the rule “absolute” and to decry any departure from it, which in 
turn obscured the legislators’ evident interest in “rescue.” 
                                                 
16   See, e.g. Vannessa Finch, Re-Invigorating Corporate Rescue, 2003 J. BUS. L. 
527, 536-39 (2003); see also Gabriel Moss, Comparative Bankruptcy Cultures: Rescue or 
Liquidation? Comparison of Trends in National Law—England, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 115, 
121 (1997).  
17   John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 
963 (1989). 
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The issue is whether interest of specific owners in a specific 
publicly held company is worthy of consideration, especially if equity 
is “under water” or “out of the money.”  The contractualists consider 
that equity investors at that point cease to be parties in any real sense 
because of the absolute priority rule. Thus, the law’s concern should 
be solely with the interests of those who remain in the hunt. But the 
public interest in ensuring that shareholder interests are appropriately 
considered remains an important one, beyond recoveries in particular 
cases.  Is a quick exit for equity sound business policy, given the 
importance of equity investing in the capital markets?  That sort of 
public interest should be considered in deciding, for example, whether 
case law should give shareholders more protection against 
undervaluation of their company and other financial maneuvers.  Little 
evidence can be found of an appreciation that there may be a public 
interest in the resolution of that question. 
The lack of consideration of a possible public interest in these 
decisions—a public interest in jobs, in community stability, and in 
promoting and protecting equity interests—seems especially 
anomalous because they played an important part in the adoption of 
the most important single reform in the 1978 Code.  That reform 
replaced a trustee in bankruptcy with a Debtor-in-Possession (“DIP”), 
conferring extraordinary power and flexibility on the managements of 
distressed businesses in Chapter 11.18  Yet the notion of protecting 
owners of companies provided important support for that reform.  If 
they are now replaced by an assumption, often explicit, that only the 
interests of creditors are important, and that the maximization of value 
for creditors is the only aim of bankruptcy law,  then the idea of putting 
old management in charge of a company’s Chapter 11 case needs 
comprehensive review.  Indeed, because nowadays the result is often 
to put a secured creditor in control despite its conflict of interest with 
the rest of the creditors, the DIP concept seems ripe for revisiting.19  
It is in consideration of the public interest in protecting equity 
investors that puts that question on the table. 
                                                 
18   11 U.S.C. §1107. 
19  See generally A. Mechele Dickerson, Privatizing Ethics in Corporate 
Reorganizations, 93 MINN. L. REV. 875 (2009). 
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III. A POSSIBLE RESPONSE 
The nature and weight of these public interest factors in the 
evolution of reorganization is a long discussion far beyond the 
boundaries of this essay.  What I do want to suggest are possible 
reasons for the lack of concern for the role of the public interest in 
commercial law debates.  No doubt part of the answer is political.  
Regulation is not popular in the abstract, despite the recent reminders 
of the effects of deregulation provided by the Great Recession.  But 
another reason for this lack of concern is that the regulators in 
academia have been too long on the defensive and have had too little 
new to offer.  The contractualists have proclaimed “The End of 
Bankruptcy”20 (via secured creditor control, which they embrace) and 
devised ever more clever and intricate ways for contract to replace legal 
provisions.  All these have provided much fuel for academic reflection, 
tinkering, and debate. The regulators have been “traditionalists” 
defending the eroding status quo.  Professors Warren and Block-Lieb 
published their public interest articles a decade ago, but little new has 
been done to explain or vindicate the interests they identified.  
Although the contractualists have largely run out of intellectual steam 
themselves, until the regulators resume a positive reform agenda at the 
conceptual level the public interest will remain behind the door when 
bankruptcy policy is made.  The same is true throughout commercial 
law. 
One step that courts might be encouraged to take would be to 
try to identify (or encourage the parties to identify) any public interest 
factors in a commercial dispute.  In an appropriate case, they could 
even invite governmental agencies or NGOs to submit views and 
arguments if those submissions would not unduly delay the case or 
increase the expense for the private parties.  Pointing out those 
opportunities would be a major step forward in rediscovering the 
public interests we have somehow misplaced. 
                                                 
20   See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 
55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 754-55 (2002) (describing a fundamental shift in Chapter 11 
bankruptcy from a reorganization vehicle to a means of liquidation driven in large 
part by secured creditors who increasingly view the sales value of a firm’s current 
assets as greater than the going-concern value of those assets in the future). 
